

Military Withdrawal from Politics: Discourse and Reform Agenda

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Abstrak

Di jaman Orde Baru, intervensi militer dalam urusan-urusan non-militer sangat intensif dan ekstensif. Bagi kehidupan demokrasi, costs yang ditanggung jauh melebihi benefits yang diperoleh. Karenanya, tuntutan penarikan intervensi militer dalam bidang non-militer semakin lama semakin kuat dan memuncak belakangan ini.

Di tengah-tengah besarnya gelombang tuntutan reformasi total atas format politik Indonesia di Orde Reformasi ini, respons pemerintah terhadap tuntutan reformasi sistem dan kelembagaan sipil cukup "akomodatif" walaupun upaya-upaya mempertahankan pola rezim lama masih terlihat kuat. Di sisi lain, tuntutan reformasi atas posisi dan peran militer dalam bentuk penarikan intervensi militer dalam politik disikapi dengan resistensi berbau romantisme sejarah. Tulisan ini berusaha menelusuri agenda reformasi peran sosial-politik militer melalui telaah diskursus penarikan intervensi militer dalam politik.

Dalam "membawa" diskursus ke agenda praksis, kendala yang ditemui tidak sedikit. Namun demikian, kejadian-kejadian dramatis setelah Orde Reformasi ditegakkan, seperti penghapusan tiga jalur dalam Golkar (ABRI, Birokrasi, Golkar) serta tuntutan luas pemisahan Korps Polisi dari ABRI, telah memberi entry points dan dukungan luas ke arah itu. Tapi jalan yang mesti dilalui masih panjang dan berliku. Pada titik inilah concern dan peran reformis dan kelompok pro-demokrasi menjadi imperatif.

The Indonesian armed forces has been playing a significant role in Indonesian politics since at least 1957 when the martial law was enacted. For many years after Soeharto assumed power in 1966, the army intervened in all aspects of people's political life; it "dominated the country's government almost completely ... decisively overshadowing and controlling — if not in a functional sense subsuming — all others."¹

The pervasive role of the military in Indonesian political life is justified especially by *dwifungsi* doctrine, the doctrine that the military has a dual or twin function, that is, as a military force and a socio-political force. As William Liddle observed, *dwifungsi* has been

used to justify: appointment of large numbers of military officers to Parliament, the MPR, and regional legislature; the placement of first serving, then retired officers in controlling positions in Golkar; military supervi-

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¹ George McT. Kahin, "Foreward," in Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Revised Edition

(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 9.

sion of the internal workings of other parties and of the general elections; military intelligence surveillance of the press, legitimated through a doctrine of a 'free and responsible' press; and the appointment of many officers to cabinet and sub-cabinet positions.²

Prior to the resignation of Soeharto, it has become common to see the legitimacy problems of the Indonesian government as having two separate aspects, one to do with the regime as such (and President Soeharto specifically), and one to do with the armed forces (and the army in particular). With the fall of Soeharto, the military is now a subject of scrutiny. This article focuses on the later.

The legitimacy problem can be traced back. With the growing concern of many Indonesians about democratisation in politics and economics, there has emerged a growing challenge toward military intervention in non-military sectors. Over time the challenges intensify. While prior to the 1990s the challenges were mostly presented in political trials or underground publications or debated half openly by reform-minded groups within the military, in the first half of 1990s civilians, particularly pro-democracy groups, openly demand the reduction of military intervention, and even the abolition of *dwifungsi* doctrine. The demands become more daring and so open since Soeharto was forced to step down by students.

² R. William Liddle, "Politics 1992-1993: Sixth Term Adjustments in the Ruling Formula," in Chris Manning and Joan Hardjono (eds.), *Indonesia Assessment 1993, Labour: Sharing in the Benefits of Growth?* (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1993), p. 29.

In this reform era, proposed reforms in political parties, election system, restructuring of Parliament have been paid serious attention. Reform agenda in the socio-political role of the military, however, is still unclear whereas such a reform would be a cornerstone of the success of total reforms in Indonesian political format as was intended by many sections of the communities.

The socio-political role of the military take forms military "participation" in non-military sectors. Reforms in the socio-political roles thus mean reforms in the military role in non-military tasks. This work examines proposed reforms in military "participation" in politics,³ and the discussion would focus on discourse and reform agenda on military withdrawal from politics.

Concept and Factors Leading to Military Withdrawal

There are many similar terms which can be used to refer to "military withdrawal from politics." That is, "return to the barracks," "military exit from politics," and "military disengagement." "Return to the barracks" according to S.E. Finer refers to "abdication" and "re-civilianization." "**Abdication**" or the "military's disengagement from overt rule" refers to the termination of military rule and replacing it with civilian rule. Finer argues that the military would return to the barracks if three problems occurred, namely, conflict between the military and

³ Military "participation" in politics is the most crucial one as it is a driving force for "participation" in other fields (e.g. economic activities).

conspiratorial civilians, growing friction within the military, and economic and political difficulties faced by military rulers.⁴ “*Re-civilianization*” on the other hand deals with the concern, decision, and struggle of civilian elements of the society, not under the dictation of the military junta, to have civilian rule. The military leaders may have some influence in this political movement but such influence is minor since the principal decisions and actions are taken by civilian leaders. Facing growing pressure from civilians, the military is often in a dilemma concerning whether to remain in office or return to the barracks. If the military decides to disengage from politics, “the men on horseback” would re-civilianise the government and concentrate on enhancing their professionalism.⁵

In distinguishing between “military withdrawal or disengagement” and “de-intervention or civilianization,” Danopoulos says that :

Withdrawal or disengagement can be defined as the substitution of praetorian policies and personnel with those advocated by the recognized civilian authorities. De-intervention or civilianization on the other hand, refers to limited or partial disengagement and denotes a situation in which the military coopts and/or forms coalitions with a selected number of civilians

(usually technocrats). In such circumstances, the military is the dominant partner and the civilians play an auxiliary role.⁶

Thus, the difference between these terms lies in the degree of civilian rule vis-à-vis military rule or the position of military in the government. In “military withdrawal or disengagement” the role of the military is auxiliary, whereas in “de-intervention or civilianization” its role is still dominant in the system. The former, therefore, can be regarded as (relatively) total/complete or substantial withdrawal whereas the latter is limited or partial withdrawal

Another expert, Talukder Maniruzzaman, defines military withdrawal from politics as:

the return of the intervening army to the military barracks, with the military playing only an instrumental role, leaving the civilian political leadership in an unfettered position to determine political goals and make all “decisions of decisive consequence” for the state. Under this model, the army does have influence on decisions affecting defense and foreign policies of the state, but in this respect the military performs only staff functions. It provides expert advice but does not challenge the authority of the civilian political

⁴ S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Second, enlarged edition (Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 173-174.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-186. Regarding the dilemmas faced by the military, see also Christopher Clapham and George Philip (eds.), *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985).

⁶ Danopoulos, quoted by Suvarnajata Supaluck, *The Thai Military Coup D'Etat: Origins, Withdrawal/Civilian Control, and Perspectives*, Ph.D. Thesis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Service, 1995), p. 157. For Danopoulos' prominent work, see Constantine P. Danopoulos, “Civilian Supremacy in Changing Society: Comparative Perspectives,” in Constantine P. Danopoulos (ed.), *Civilian Rule in Developing World: Democracy on the March?* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992).

leadership even if the decision of the civilian authorities is contrary to the advice submitted by the military.⁷

Maniruzzaman's concept of military withdrawal is therefore not so different to that of Danopoulos' "military withdrawal or disengagement" and Finer's "return to the barracks." They insist that even though the military retreats from politics, they still have an influence and a role in political life. This influence, however, is minor, and the role is instrumental, and as a consequence the military is under the shadow of civilian leadership.

In the search for an operational definition, Maniruzzaman further claims that to determine whether there is military withdrawal one question can be raised: "Who is the final decision-maker in all critical and substantive issues confronting the state, and with whose support does the decision-maker exercise ultimate power?"⁸ This is because many juntas cleverly camouflage the nature of their regime. They have often "civilianised" the regime by running general elections to acquire political legitimacy from the people (Mobutu in Zaire, Kerekon in Benin, Eyadema in Togo), conducting "plebiscites" and securing a large majority of votes for themselves (Nasser in Egypt, Pinochet in Chile), or installing civilian figures "in power" (civilian president in Bangladesh in 1975-6 and 1983-4). This kind of "civilianisation," however, cannot be categorised as (total/substantial) military withdrawal since the true ruler is still the military or the

ruling class use the military as a power base in governing the people.⁹

Military withdrawal from politics is not always final. The military may wish to regain power for one reason or another. Because of this, in the study of military politics, there are also the terms of "short-term withdrawal" and "long-term withdrawal."¹⁰

Nordlinger argues that there are three factors behind military withdrawal from politics. Firstly, extensive civilian opposition to the military regime. The opposition can take the form of civilian pressures such as demonstrations, strikes, and riots. In world history, this type of opposition has succeeded in forcing the military to surrender power to civilian government. Sudan in 1964, Thailand in 1973¹¹ and 1992, and South Korea in the early 1990s are prominent examples. Secondly, the overthrow of military government by dissident officers (coup d'état) followed by the handing over of power to civilian politicians. This occurred in Argentine in 1955,

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 17 - 27, and Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 170. Supaluck suggests that to achieve a long-term withdrawal or to maintain civilian control over the military, civilian leadership must look after military interests by providing attention to military budgets, financial support, and respect for their advice and hopes. This, however, is not sufficient, "political institutions of the country, including the political skills of politicians, must be continuously developed," he adds (Supaluck, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166). On this matter, he quotes India as a case in point in that the military can be effectively controlled by civilians "simply because of the political skills of its politicians and the arts of administration" (*ibid.*, p. 166).

¹¹ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 139.

⁷ Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal From Politics: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Balinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 19-20.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Columbia in 1957, and Venezuela in 1958. The main motive of the military in restoring civilian rule is to eliminate destabilising counter coups. Another motive is to maintain the unity of the military corps.¹² Thirdly, voluntary disengagement, brought about by unexpected difficulties the military faces as politicians, a willingness to promote democracy, and/or the desire to create and maintain military reputation and professionalism.¹³

In his study on military withdrawal in developing worlds between 1945-1984, Talukder Maniruzzaman found that, firstly, 36 percent of military withdrawal took place "through planned elections held under the auspices of the outgoing military regimes."¹⁴ Secondly, 27 percent of the withdrawals were because the military rulers abruptly or suddenly decided to hand power to civilians. Thirdly, foreign intervention or invasion caused 12 percent of withdrawals. Fourthly, 18 percent and 7 percent of such disengagements were due to social revolution and mass uprising respectively.¹⁵

Meanwhile, Ulf Sundhaussen proposes three factors contributing to military withdrawal. First of all, the endogenous factor, that is the willingness of the military to withdraw. This can happen peacefully (voluntarily withdrawal) or through internal military conflict (inner contraction) and even through coups and counter coups (after staging a coup the military may return power to civilians). Secondly, are factors exogenous to the military, namely, opposi-

tion to the military establishment or military rule. This opposition may be as a reaction to the oppressive nature of the military regime or to the failure of the army in fulfilling its promise to solve economic or political crises. The opposition can also be as a result of successful efforts in economic development, thus creating critical groups such as the middle class and the working class. Sundhaussen argues that "new middle classes and a new industrial proletariat will seek more participation, or even demand the right to govern."¹⁶ Thirdly, are factors exogenous to the state. In this case, foreign pressure, intervention, and even invasion can stimulate or force the military to hand power to civilians.¹⁷

Sundhaussen's categorisation thus supersedes that of Nordlinger and Maniruzzaman. Nordlinger's second and third factors (military coups and voluntarily withdrawal) and Maniruzzaman's first and second factors (election under the auspices of the military and sudden military decision to withdraw) can be included amongst the endogenous factors. Nordlinger's first factor (extensive civilian opposition) and Maniruzzaman's fourth factor (social revolution and mass

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 140-141.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-147.

¹⁴ Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics*, op. cit., p. 206.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23, 206.

¹⁶ Ulf Sundhaussen, "Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Summer 1984, p. 548.

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 545-554; Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Durability of Military Regimes in South-East Asia," in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.), *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia* (Singapore, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 272; Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Inner Contraction of the Soeharto Regime: a starting point for a withdrawal to the barracks," in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s* (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp. 272-284.

uprising) are factors exogenous to the military. Meanwhile, Maniruzzaaman's third factor (foreign intervention or invasion) is included amongst factors exogenous to the state.¹⁸

In a praetorian state, one main purpose of the movement to minimise military power is to promote democracy. A declining military role, however, is not identical with democratisation, and the existence of civilian control does not necessarily mean democracy. In Singapore, Malaysia, and in communist countries such as Vietnam, China, and the former Soviet Union, where civilian supremacy exists, the performance of democracy is not impressive. One could even call them authoritarian or totalitarian.

However, it is wrong to say that civilian supremacy means nothing in relation to democratisation. Rather, "placing the military under the authority of the elected [civilian] government is a key facilitating condition for democratic consolidation."¹⁹ It is true that in some "civilian" countries democracy does not work, but democracy only works in a country which uphold the notion of civilian control, not in a country under a military regime.²⁰ Conversely, the go-

vernment under military control is identical with authoritarianism, the abuse of power, human rights violation, and anti-democracy.²¹ This is because the military monopolises arms²² and most military regimes "definitely rule by force and violence."²³ Because of the frequent use of violence, violence itself even has become a tool of military's "legitimacy" to rule the country. By minimising military power the possibility of using force will be reduced. This certainly could pave the way for greater opportunity of the people to express their opinions and freedoms without much restriction or surveillance from the military. Recent military withdrawal in the rest of the world supports this argument. After the military returned to the barracks the development of democratic political systems in Thailand, South Korea, Argentina, Brazil and so on has been notable.

Dual Function : Doctrine, Implementation and Institutionalisation

The Indonesian military is unique due to its doctrine called *dwifungsi* (dual function). The origins of dual function doctrine came from Nasution's Middle Way speech on 12 November 1958. He said that:

¹⁸ There is actually an alternative theory or explanation known as the capitalist development approach, however I am unable to present due to limited space.

¹⁹ J.S. Valenzuela, quoted by Young-Chul Paik, "Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea," in *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 1994, p. 736.

²⁰ In Nordlinger's words, "The values of political equality, liberty, freedom of opposition, and constitutionalism are thought to be realizable only where civilian supremacy is respected and civilian

control is implemented." See Eric A. Nordlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

²¹ In relation to this, Nordlinger says that "All military regimes are authoritarian in that they eliminate or extensively limit political rights, liberties, and competition, at least until the officers are getting ready to return to the barracks." See *ibid.*, p. 25.

²² S.E. Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²³ Suvarnajata Supaluck, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

We do not and will not copy the situation as it exists in several Latin American states, where the military acts as a direct political force; nor will we emulate the Western European model, where armies are the dead tool [of government].²⁴

Rather, he argued, the military was “one of the forces of the people’s struggle which was at the same level and which fought shoulder to shoulder with other forces, such as parties.”²⁵ The armed forces themselves would stand between those two extremes, neither politically active nor apathetic. Due to its contribution in the struggle for independence, the military, he claimed, “had the right to participate in the decision-making processes determining the destiny of the country.”²⁶ To exercise this right, the armed forces “must have a place in *all* the institutions of the state, not just in the National Council and the cabinet...but also in the National Planning Council, the diplomatic corps, parliament, and elsewhere in the government.”²⁷ Should this right not be respected by politicians, Nasution warned, “it could not be guaranteed that the army

would eschew violence to prevent discrimination against its officers.”²⁸

There were two main purposes of Nasution’s speech. Firstly, he wanted to justify the increasing military intervention in non-military sectors since the enactment of martial law in 1957. Secondly, he wanted to clarify the military position in the National Council.²⁹ In regard to the latter, it was because the National Council “did not specifically include the army as one of the functional groups.”³⁰ Rather, they were included as “ex-officio Presidential appointees in the same category as appointed cabinet ministers in the Council.”³¹ If the military was recognised as a functional group, their presence in political institutions would have a legal basis and it could be used as a stepping stone for entering other political institutions.

In November 1958 the Parliament and Cabinet finally accepted the military as a functional group. The main reason for this “major concession from political parties,”³² was because the politicians were worried that the military would stage coups as was

²⁴ This speech was published in *Pos Indonesia*, 13 November 1958. See Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society,” in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978), p. 47.

²⁵ David Jenkins, “The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of *Dwifungsi*,” in *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1983, p. 20.

²⁶ Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society,” *loc. cit.*

²⁷ David Jenkins, *loc. cit.*

²⁸ Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959* (Ithaca and London: Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1966), p. 192.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

³⁰ Yong Mun Cheong, “The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-1959,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 1, March 1976, p. 96.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 96. The National Council recognised just ten functional groups, that is, workers, youths, farmers and peasants, co-operatives, intellectuals, journalists, religious leaders, women, veterans, and naturalised citizens. For Nasution’s thinking of the military as a functional group, see Herbert Feith and Lance Castle, *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 428-431.

³² Young Mun Cheong, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

the cases in many developing countries in this era, such as in Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, and Sudan.³³

Nasution's next manoeuvre was to launch the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution, giving as a reason that the parliamentary system under liberal democracy created instability, disunity, and economic stagnation. However, this move can also be seen as "a part of Nasution's strategy of giving the military a legitimate socio-political position in the country."³⁴ By the return to the 1945 Constitution, which guarantees the existence of functional groups in the MPR, the military — if it continued to be accepted as a functional group — would have a more secure position.

In April 1965, the army held a seminar, where it formally adopted the doctrine of *dwifungsi*, according to which the army claimed that it had a dual role or function, namely as a military force and as a socio-political force. As a military force, the army is responsible for defence and security, whereas as a socio-political force the activities of the military cover ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and spiritual and religious fields.³⁵

Dwifungsi has been implemented in four main ways. Firstly, through the restructure of territorial management. To do so, the military re-designed its territorial management, establishing territorial commands

paralleling every level of civilian bureaucracy. Because of such a structure many experts, such as Harold Crouch,³⁶ argued that the position of the military command is no less than a shadow government at every level of government. The structure along with military-dominated bureaucracy not only provided the military with a formidable capacity to control civilian bureaucracy and direct the result of, for instance, elections, but also provided opportunities to spy and control people's political activities in any region.

Secondly, through the military's "participation" in political institutions. In the early 1980s, 20,000 military officers³⁷ occupied civilian positions in the executive, MPR (the highest institution in Indonesia), DPR (parliament), BPK (Supreme Audit Board), DPA (Advisory Council), and MA (Supreme Courts). In recent times, the number of military ministers decreased. Their number heading departments and non-departments as well as a state secretary declined from 13 in 1981 to 8 in 1988. In the 1993-1998 Cabinet their number levelled off,³⁸ and decreased significantly in the Habibie's Cabinet. Even though this figure shows a downward trend, strategic posts such as the Department of Defence and Security (which could control the Department of Foreign Affairs), Home Affairs, Coordinating Minister (responsible for "coordinating" many

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Salim Said., *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics 1945-1949* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 136.

³⁵ Nugroho Notosusanto, *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Department of Defence and Security, 1975), pp. 70-71.

³⁶ *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995.

³⁷ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 May 1995.

³⁸ See Ben Anderson, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," especially The Fifth Development Cabinet, *Indonesia*, No. 45, April 1988, pp. 161-162; and The Editors, "The Sixth Development Cabinet Announced March 17, 1993," *Indonesia*, No. 55, April 1993, pp. 167-176.

departments) were still dominated by the military.

Thirdly, through its "presence" in the political arena. In the New Order era, besides being in Parliament, the most obvious example of military penetration of the political arena is their presence in the government party, Golkar (Functional Group). Golkar consists of three elements, that is, the armed forces, civil servants, and civilian politicians/activists. As for the military position, Sudomo (former Chief of Kopkamtib) asserted that "ABRI [the armed forces] was absolutely Golkar and a key member of the Big Golkar Family."³⁹

To control the political arena the Soeharto government also created mechanisms to justify military intervention. The existence of the worker-employer relations code, the law on political parties and Golkar, the anti-subversion law, the (political) criminal code, and other repressive laws were part of the mechanism. The establishment of Kopkamtib,⁴⁰ "the most oppressive and most

feared agency of the regime,"⁴¹ is also included. Through these mechanisms the military not only had power to interfere with the appointment of the leaders of political parties and mass organisations and to screen the campaign topics, but also to interfere in worker disputes and to arrest labour leaders, dissidents, NGO activists, and even intellectuals and former generals.

Fourthly, through its involvement in economic activities. Military economic or business activities existed before the birth of *dwifungsi*; the creation of *dwifungsi* can even be regarded as justifying such activities. One main reason for this is because the weak and ineffective government during the early 1950s failed to allocate sufficient budget for the military's operations, basic needs, and amenities of its personnel "to enable members of the armed forces to live in a style to which they felt entitled."⁴² The military claimed that such business activities were a part of its role as a stabiliser, especially to prevent social jealousy among military personnel and therefore to prevent military rebellion. With the creation of *dwifungsi* in 1958, the military has a legitimate tool to "participate" and spread its activities in business, not only in the big state enterprises but also in petty companies.

³⁹ An Asia Watch Report, *Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor* (USA: The Asia Watch Committee, 1989), p. 34.

⁴⁰ As the criticism of this extra constitutional institution was so strong, in 1988 the government attempted to "humanise" this body by replacing it with Bakorstanas (Coordinating Board for Assisting in the Consolidation of National Stability) whose permanent members consisted of the Coordinating Ministers' Secretaries, representatives from ABRI Headquarters, the Army, Navy, Air Forces, National Police, Attorney General's offices, and the intelligence service. Although the authority of the new body was reduced, Bakorstanas (or Bakorstanasda at regional level) is still frightening as it still "has a right" to undermine worker strikes, screen political candidates, arrest activists, interrogate dissidents, and so on. See *ibid.*, pp. 44-48; Richard Tanter, "The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence Organisations in the

Indonesian State," in Arief Budiman, (ed.), *State and Civil Society in Indonesia* (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp. 220-221; and Richard Tanter, "After Kopkamtib: Indonesia's Intelligence and Security Apparatus," *Inside Indonesia*, No. 18, April 1989, pp. 4-6.

⁴¹ Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society," *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁴² Harold Crouch, "Generals and Business in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 1975-76, p. 520.

With the establishment of the New Order, the military role in business expanded rapidly because most of high ranking military officers became members of the ruling group which commanded “almost unlimited access to expanding financial resources in the economy.”⁴³ They were assigned to supply a constant flow of funds to the army and were allowed “to reap off part of the proceeds as a reward for their efforts, provided they did not take ‘too much’.”⁴⁴ The most important source of funds was Pertamina.

The military also established business empires by forming fund raising bodies, either in the form of military-owned fund raisers, such as enterprises, cooperatives, or *yayasan* (foundations) or in the form of joint ventures with Chinese businessmen and foreign investors.⁴⁵ Even though not all military economic activities/enterprises

succeeded, generally their business expanded during the oil boom.

Since the dismissal of Ibnu Sutowo in 1976, the business of the military had declined significantly, especially when in the mid 1980s the oil prices collapsed drastically, followed by rationalisation of the Indonesian economy. *The Economist* reported that:

The generals are losing their hold on Indonesian business. The armed forces’ business empires are being rationalised, their string of corporations brought to heel, and retired officers’ sinecures are being turned into real jobs under civilian managers.⁴⁶

The trend of Chinese businessmen to eschew military business partners was also responsible for such a decline.⁴⁷ This apparently related to government policy in the post oil boom period, namely to encourage the expansion of the private sector to replace dependence of the economy on oil production. In this new environment, the rigid, incapable, and conservative nature of military management was regarded as hampering ambitious business expansion.

Finally, the opening of diplomatic relations with China in 1989/1990 and the opening up of East Timor in early 1989 had implications as well. As a result of direct trade relations with the communist China, the businessmen no longer needed to contact, and therefore to pay tribute, to the Ministry of Defence. The monopoly of mili-

⁴³ Jon Ormur Halldorson, *State, Class and Regime in Indonesia: Structural Impediments to Democratization*, Ph.D. Thesis (Canterbury: University of Kent, 1991), p. 181.

⁴⁴ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

⁴⁵ Inkopad, Inkopal, Inkopau, and Inkopak are examples of co-operatives established by the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Police Force respectively. The Army headquarters had PT. Tri Usaha Bakti under Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (YKEP) and Kostrad had Yayasan Dharma Putra. Meanwhile, local commands had PT. Propelat (Bandung), Bank Brawijaya (Surabaya), Bank Bukit Barisan (Medan), and so on. In joint venture enterprises, the military had shares in PT. Berdikari, Bank Dharma Ekonomi, Bank Windu Kencana, Hotel Borobudur, Hotel Kartika Plaza, and so on. See Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 250-268; Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-303; *Editor*, 19 September 1992; *Forum Keadilan*, 28 August and 25 September 1995.

⁴⁶ *The Economist*, 8 October 1988.

⁴⁷ Yuri Sato, “The Development of Business Groups in Indonesia 1967-1989,” in Takashi Shiraishi (ed.), *Approaching Soeharto’s Indonesia from the Margins* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 132.

tary-owned business enterprises in East Timor, such as in the coffee trade, had been undermined by the new comers.⁴⁸

The decline of military business, and therefore profits, forced the military to restructure its enterprises. Deregulation, managerial reform, and so on were conducted to optimise the performance of its business. These attempts certainly succeeded; their results have appeared in the early 1990s.⁴⁹ This success caused the army to encourage its officers to increase their managerial skills by employing military officers in the Department of Finance, taking short courses, or obtaining MBA degrees.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Cf. *The Economist*, 8 October 1988 and see Herb Feith, "East Timor: The Opening-up, the Crackdown and the Possibility of a Durable Settlement," in Harold Crouch and Hal Hill (eds.), *Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s* (Canberra: ANU, 1992).

⁴⁹ In 1992, for example, military business rose when YKEP joined in the project of the Sudirman Centre Business District (SCBD) worth Rp 7,5 trillion (US\$ 3,7 billions). In the area of construction, the military joined with Tommy Winata and Sugianto Kusuma in establishing PT Jakarta International Hotel and Development (JIHD). YKEP with Tommy Soeharto's Humpuss Group remanaged Sempati Air, and today it has become the largest private airflight enterprise in Indonesia. YKEP is also conducting a joint venture with Mitsubishi to build a power station worth US\$ 500 million. In banking, YKEP ran Bank Artha Graha (formerly Bank Propelat). In 1994, the assets of this bank were Rp 482 milliard (US\$ 241 million) with an annual profit of Rp 4,6 milliard (US\$ 2,3 million). The bulk of YKEP's profit comes from the military business in timber; in 1994, the military-owned timber company, PT. ITCI, which subordinates nine enterprises, earned a profit of Rp 200 milliard (US\$ 100 million). PT Timah is also reportedly more efficient (healthy). See *Forum Keadilan*, 28 August 1995.

⁵⁰ *Editor*, 19 September 1992.

In short, although military business has declined compared to the Ibnu Sutowo era, it is still significant in maintaining the financial resources of the military. Meanwhile, the military's commitment in economic activities remains high.

As *dwifungsi* is a tool of legitimacy of military "participation" in non-military sectors, the military is very concerned to preserve this doctrine. The statement that *dwifungsi* will be adjusted depending on the situation does not mean that *dwifungsi* will disappear. Conversely, the military claims that *dwifungsi* is permanent. To realise this claim the military has institutionalised the doctrine in all aspects : in legislation,⁵¹ in education system (both civilian and military education curriculum),⁵² and in development programs ("ABRI Enters the Village").⁵³ *Dwifungsi* is institutionalised by govern-

⁵¹ Bilveer Singh, *Dwifungsi ABRI, The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Origins, Actualization and Implications for Stability and Development* (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp. 50-51. J.C.T. Simorangkir and B. Mang Reng Say, *Around and About The Indonesian Constitution of 1945* (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1980), p. 24. For Law 20/1982 see Article 26, 27, 28 and their elucidation; for Law 2/1988 see Article 6 and its elucidation.

⁵² See Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional (Lemhanas), *Kewiraan Untuk Mahasiswa* (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia, 1980, 1991; David Bouchier, "The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics," in David Bouchier and John Legge (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53; Charles Donald McFetridge, "Seskoed - Training the Elite," *Indonesia*, No. 36, October 1983, p. 95; David Jenkins, *Soeharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1984), p. 264.

⁵³ David E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia's Armed Forces: Rejuvenation and Regeneration," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1982, p. 152.

ment discourse as well. *Dwifungsi* is called an Indonesian culture and therefore it should be preserved. In the meantime, with the concept of the family principle (*kekeluargaan*), the government has claimed that all Indonesian citizens (civilian or military) have equal rights to participate in politics. The most crucial development is the government's attempts to make *dwifungsi* sacred by linking it to Pancasila, especially Pancasila Democracy.⁵⁴ It is said that *dwifungsi* is a part of the implementation of Pancasila or Pancasila Democracy.⁵⁵

Discourse and Reform Agenda

In Indonesian history, opposition to military intervention in politics existed before the birth of *dwifungsi* doctrine in 1958. In the period of Liberal Democracy (1950-1957), the military's attempts to intervene in politics (such as the 17 October 1952 Affair)⁵⁶ had raised strong opposition

from political parties. The opposition grew significantly from the enactment of martial law (1957) concomitant with the rise in military penetration of non-military posts. Even though the military was finally accepted as a functional group in 1958, the acceptance was qualified by significant opposition from political parties.

In the era of Guided Democracy (1959-1965) opposition from political parties became stronger, as a reaction to the rapid expansion of military involvement in non-military fields. In this period, its doctrine was identified as a source of corruption, rising workers' unemployment, and a barrier to civil servants' careers. As the political parties rejected the implementation of *dwifungsi* as well as its doctrine, opponents of the military demanded the reduction of military intervention in non-military sectors and even the military's return to the barracks.⁵⁷

In the New Order era, the seed of opposition to *dwifungsi* was sown very early, signalling an end to the political honeymoon between the military and civilians. In April 1969, for example, one year after Soeharto took on full Presidential powers, Indonesian students started to question military intervention in non-military sectors, such as the bureaucracy, trade and industry, agriculture, husbandry, publishing, and so on.⁵⁸ The students claimed that the military lacked the

⁵⁴ R. William Liddle, "Politics 1992-1993: Sixth Term Adjustment in the Ruling Formula," *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁵⁵ The New Order government often says that "*Dwifungsi* is an implementation of Pancasila or a part of Pancasila Democracy" or "One characteristic of Pancasila Democracy is the existence of *dwifungsi* of ABRI". According to government, these statements are based on the fourth principle (*sila*) of Pancasila (Five Principles); this fourth *sila* is said to adhere to the principle of familiness (*kekeluargaan*) and is becoming the core of Pancasila Democracy (democracy based on consultation and consensus). It is argued that in this type of democracy, all Indonesian citizens, including the military, are one family; they have equal positions and rights to participate in all aspects of people's life. Thus, the *dwifungsi* doctrine claiming that the military has rights to participate in all fields of state affairs is said to be the implementation of or part of (the fourth *sila* of) Pancasila or Pancasila Democracy.

⁵⁶ In this affair, the army attempted to force Soekarno to dissolve the existing Parliament.

⁵⁷ See A.H. Nasution, *Kekaryaan ABRI* (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971), p. 121-142; Nugroho Notosusanto (ed.), *Pejuang dan Prajurit*, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-329; and David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking," *op. cit.*, pp. 15-23.

⁵⁸ Imam Yudotomo, "Partner Bagi ABRI: Suatu Masalah," *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, No. 147, Th. IV, Minggu ke-I, April 1969.

knowledge and ability to manage their non-military tasks, and as a result, many enterprises under military management became bankrupt and were liquidated, the production of state farms declined sharply, the public administration was in disorder, the reputation of government officials degraded, and democratic life was not developed but eroded.⁵⁹

Opposition to the military persisted throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Waves of opposition emerged in three periods. The first period was 1973-1974, with opposition centring around the Malari Affair.⁶⁰ In this period, *dwifungsi* was criticised and opposed by students, intellectual, and activists.⁶¹ Military business activities and corruption were also the targets. Shortly before the climax of the affair (15 January 1974), it was reported that the opposition

was “totally anti-Golkar and antimilitary.”⁶² The second period, 1977-1980, coincided with the 1977-1978 student movement and President Soeharto’s speech in 1980 in Pekanbaru (the Petition of 50). In this second wave, the opposition groups, who were either civilians or retired military officers, urged a significant reduction of military presence in civilian posts and in day-to-day political life, and the ending of corruption. Some radicals, moreover, demanded the abolition of military doctrine.⁶³ Thirdly, from 1987 onward was the period of the resurrection of the student movement. Even though this movement was not as strong as its two precursors (the 1973/74 and 1977/78 student movements), students displayed a strong anti-military intervention in politics. In this period, Ali Sadikin, retired ABRI (Admiral) officer and former governor of Jakarta, also made a statement that “the army’s *dwifungsi* (the doctrine and practice of military involvement in politics) must disappear.”⁶⁴

Although opposition to military intervention and *dwifungsi* doctrine, both from civilians and the military itself, existed over

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Malari (*Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari*, the 15 January Affair) was the first and biggest demonstration after 1966, which took place during the visit of the Japanese PM Tanaka. In this movement, students focused mainly on foreign capital, development strategy, the President’s special assistance (ASPRI), and the corruption of the top-ranking government officials. In this affair, 11 people were killed, 800 arrested, 100 buildings burnt down, and 800 cars destroyed. See Gary Hansen, “Indonesia 1974: A Momentous Year,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XV., No. 5, February 1975, p. 149.

⁶¹ One student, for example, argued that *dwifungsi* was “a primitive philosophy, as in the modern era we need and rely upon specialisation.” See Yusuf Abdullah Puar, *KAMI*, 30 August 1973, in Sukmadji Indro Tjahjono, *op. cit.*, p. 119. Meanwhile, an intellectual and NGO activist, Adnan Buyung Nasution, argued that “the creation of *dwifungsi* was a fault, and therefore it must be finished.” *Tempo*, 15 December 1973.

⁶² David Jenkins, *Soeharto and His Generals*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁶³ The most comprehensive and systematic criticism – which used historical, constitutional, political, and philosophical approaches – demanding the abolition of *dwifungsi* can be found in Sukmadji Indro Tjahjono, *Indonesia di Bawah Sepatu Lars* (Bandung: Komite Pembelaan Mahasiswa ITB, 1979). Other documents criticising military doctrine include Lukman Hakim, *Kudengar Indonesia Memanggil* (Jakarta: Badan Kerjasama Mahasiswa Indonesia, 1980), and Ibrahim G. Zakir, *Dari Jenggawah ke Siria-ria* (Jakarta: Badan Kerjasama Mahasiswa Indonesia, 1980).

⁶⁴ Ali Sadikin’s interview, *Inside Indonesia*, October 1988, p. 4.

many years, formal debate over military withdrawal occurred between 1977-1980. As the debate was initiated by the military, the debate was mainly between serving officers and retired generals, with little participation by civilians. In some cases their opinion was ignored by the ruling generals. Only half of the debate was made public, whereas the remainder was not covered by the media.⁶⁵ The debate over military withdrawal from politics focused on three main issues. Firstly, the idea that ABRI must be above all groups in the community; secondly, the need to reduce numbers of military men in political institutions; and finally, the issue of military withdrawal from involvement in the political arena.

In the early 1990s Indonesian politics became more dynamic after receiving “fresh blood” from the government’s discourse in 1989 on political openness. In these favourable circumstances, many issues have been debated and many areas have become the targets of criticism. Inevitably, the criticism and debate moved to a “restricted area,” i.e. the role of the military establishment.

The debate in this period was triggered by an event on 8 July 1992 when two political scientists, Miriam Budiardjo and Arbi Sanit, and a constitutional law academic, Sri Soemantri, proposed a cut in military legislative seats. They said that the “100 ABRI members in the legislative body [DPR] was too many and that this number

should be reduced in phases.”⁶⁶ The move of these academics was surprising as it had not happened before. The proposal was launched openly in a hearing with the DPR members and covered widely by the Indonesian media. *The Jakarta Post* called the initiative a controversial proposal.⁶⁷ The academics’ daring behaviour in blatantly questioning the military establishment in Indonesian politics has been described as breaking a long-standing taboo.⁶⁸ During the isolation of members of the Petition of 50 for eleven years (1980-1991), no one had dared to openly question military intervention in politics. It is true that opposition had emerged and grown since 1987, but it was not given much coverage by the public media. The academics seemed to use the momentum of political openness to channel their concerns.

The most interesting point with regard to the proposal was its rationale, that is, the improvement of democracy. The academics said that “a reduction in the number of appointed DPR members would promote democracy in the political system.”⁶⁹ Miriam Budiardjo added that “if the number of ABRI members in the DPR could be reduced in phases, it would represent ‘progress’ in the democratization process.”⁷⁰ This is because, Arbi Sanit argued, “the larger the number of appointed DPR members, the less democratic the political system.”⁷¹ The proposal for the reduction of numbers in phases meant that one day in the

⁶⁵ The debate which was not covered by the media was best captured by David Jenkins, *Soeharto and His Generals*, *op. cit.*

⁶⁶ *The Jakarta Post*, 9 July 1992

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 11 July 1992.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 9 July 1992.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 10 July 1992

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 9 July 1992.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

future, military representatives in the DPR would disappear.⁷² Sanit implicitly proposed the total abolition of DPR appointments in 4-5 general elections (20-25 years time).⁷³

The political scientists' proposal irritated many sections of the military. The former governor of Jakarta and Vice Speaker of the MPR, Gen. (Ret.) Soeprapto, for example, rebutted the argument that the (ABRI) appointments reduced democracy. In contrast, he argued that the ABRI faction in the DPR has played a significant role in the process of democratisation such as providing the momentum for political openness. According to him, the existence of military representatives must be maintained. "It is impossible to phase out ABRI members from the DPR because it would mean withdrawing them to the barracks."⁷⁴

Another military representative, Adi Sutrisno, also deplored such a proposal, asking "Are you sure democracy will grow better without us being here? We always support democratization."⁷⁵ He also claimed that "the acceptance of dual function had been strengthened by the armed forces' sociological, legal and historical relations with the people."⁷⁶ He continued that "to question the existence of ABRI representation in the DPR meant negating history."⁷⁷ Roekmini from the ABRI faction also asserted that "it was irrelevant and unrealistic to debate

dwifungsi and the existence of military representatives in the DPR."⁷⁸

On this point, Arbi Sanit argued that "the large ABRI role in the DPR was relevant only in the past when Indonesia was in a state of political and social uncertainty."⁷⁹ Since the situation had returned to normal, the military must reduce its role in the political system. He insisted that ABRI's presence in political institutions, especially in the MPR/DPR, had no constitutional basis.⁸⁰ "ABRI only had historical relations with the people because its role in politics began long ago. The Armed Forces could use its influence without entering the system,"⁸¹ he continued. In this regard, Sri Soemantri stated that according to the Constitution, the MPR members consisted of DPR members, regional representatives (*Utusan Daerah*) and functional groups (*Utusan Golongan*). In the Constitution, he argued, it is clearly stated that functional groups refer to bodies such as cooperatives, labour unions and other economic collective bodies. Therefore, Soemantri and Sanit asserted that the military is not included in this category as functional groups refers to economic groups.⁸² They implied that the position of the military in the DPR was more "vulnerable" than that of the MPR as the DPR is the legislative body which represents the people and the people's day-to-day sovereignty, not such groups (*golongan*) as the military. Bintang Pamung-

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Forum Keadilan*, 30 March 1995.

⁷⁴ *The Jakarta Post* and *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 10 July 1992.

⁷⁵ *The Jakarta Post*, 9 July 1992.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Media Indonesia*, 10 July 1992.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *The Jakarta Post*, 10 July 1992.

⁸⁰ *Forum Keadilan*, 6 August 1992.

⁸¹ *The Jakarta Post*, 10 July 1992.

⁸² For Sri Soemantri's opinion see *Kompas*, 9 July 1992, and for Arbi Sanit's analysis, see *Forum Keadilan*, 6 August 1992.

kas added that the Constitution stipulates that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the highest executor of government, thus the military is under the control of the President either as a head of government or a head of state. With this position, Bintang Pamungkas then argued that military interest should be channelled through the President, not by occupying the DPR. Thus, he continued, the existence of the armed forces officers in the DPR contravene the Constitution.⁸³ This is a view of the military as an arm of the state, part of the government employee structure, rather than as part of civil society.

Since Soeharto was forced to step down by students in May 1998 and Reform Order was enacted, there emerged a rising demand on military withdrawal. Students, political scientists, activists, politicians, military pensioners, intellectuals and former political prisoners are no longer afraid to speak out concerning total reforms on the socio-political role of the military. They do not only urge the military to withdraw from political institutions and daily political life but also openly demand the abolition of the dual function doctrine.⁸⁴ Recently, due to the shootings-to-death of students of Tri-sakti University and of students in Semanggi Bridge as well as the abduction of pro-democracy activists by Army Special Force (Kopassus), the armed forces kept silence from popular condemnation and from wide

and intensive demands to abolish dual function doctrine.

The issues raised in this reform era are not new; only scope of supports (wider supports), means of protests (direct, made in public, and so daring),⁸⁵ and their intensities distinguish recent demands to those of in the past.

From discussion above one can see that many sections of Indonesian society proposed total reforms in the socio-political role of the military in the form of total or substantial military withdrawal. This reform agenda, interestingly, is not a monopoly of pro-reform and pro-democracy activists in this Reform Order but has existed since the early times of the military intervention in non-military fields.

Impediments

Although many sections of the communities are so concerned with military withdrawal, there are some constraints in the efforts for reforms in the socio-political role of the military. There are three main impediments, that is, the existence of *dwifungsi* doctrine itself, the government's discourse in defining Indonesian (political) culture,

⁸³ See *Forum Keadilan*, 30 March 1995. With this opposition, the military then cut its seats in the Parliament from 100 to 75.

⁸⁴ *Kompas*, 1 July 1998; *Manuntung*, 9 July 1998; *Forum Keadilan*, 13 July 1998; *Kompas*, 22, 23, 24 Juli 1998.

⁸⁵ For example, if Bintang Pamungkas consistently and frequently proposed the abolition of *dwifungsi*, Ismail Sunny said that "DPR stands for People's Representative Assembly, meaning that all of its members must be elected; thus if the armed forces continue to propose the appointment of seats in the DPR, this means the armed forces intend to disobey and break the Constitution, and this must be stopped." He continued "if the armed forces would like to maintain its seats in the DPR, change the Constitution first." RCTI's panel discussion on 27 July 1998 at 23.10 WIB.

and the military's desire to protect its economic interests.⁸⁶

The Indonesian military is rather unique in its doctrine of *dwifungsi*, as is fully recognised by the army leaders. Judging from the experiences of other countries where militaries voluntarily withdraw after occupying national politics, it seems that without having a specific ideology to justify their long-term presence in politics military regimes do not usually last very long. The absence of this ideology has traditionally made them promise to restore civilian power (civilian control/supremacy) within a certain time. For example, the army usually promises to withdraw after it has restored order or installed a trustworthy (uncorrupted) civilian government. Thus, their involvement in politics is usually temporary.

In the Indonesian case, however, the *dwifungsi* doctrine fairly much eliminates these possibilities. **Firstly**, in its *dwifungsi* doctrine, the Indonesian military has a legitimate tool to justify its intervention in politics. This is because *dwifungsi* provides the military equal rights to civilians in all respects, including the right to intervene in politics. With these rights, the Indonesia's military politicians "feel no need to apologize for their power or to promise that they will return it to democratically-elected civilians."⁸⁷ Such a notion has become more prominent as a result of the military

asserting that *dwifungsi* lasts forever, meaning that the right of the Indonesian army to "participate" in politics is permanent, not temporary. This is a serious matter, as can be seen by the preparation made by the military to realise it. One crucial step is that the Indonesian military has "transplanted" *dwifungsi* into the Indonesian "body." That is, *dwifungsi* has been incorporated as a part of Pancasila Democracy, treated as Indonesian culture and said to be rooted in Indonesian history. Another prominent factor, as mentioned above, is that *dwifungsi* has been institutionalised in all aspects of people's political life, either in legislation, political institutions, the education system, or government programs (e.g. ABRI Enters the Village). As a consequence, the military (internal factor) feels that there are no reasons to withdraw to the barracks as the legislation "orders" them to participate in politics to secure national interests. This also puts the opposition groups (external factor) in a difficult position, at least in the near future, as *dwifungsi* or the military intervention has been justified by much legislation⁸⁸ and their struggle to undermine such a doctrine can be regarded as anti-Indonesian state ideology. **Secondly**, in *dwifungsi* doctrine, the concept of civilian supremacy is abolished or ignored. This relates to the notion that the military has rights equal to those of civilians. With these

⁸⁶ There is actually another crucial factor, namely structural impediments; owing to, again, limited space, I am unable to discuss it in this chance however.

⁸⁷ R. William Liddle, "Indonesia is Indonesia," in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia* (Clayton : Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), p. 57.

⁸⁸ As the Constitution does not recognise *dwifungsi*, this also creates the possibility for easy abolition of *dwifungsi* in the future, depending on the political will of the future ruling elite. On this issue, Ben Anderson said that "dual function is not recognised in the 1945 Constitution, therefore, if the armed forces would like to maintain dual function, the Constitution should be changed first." *Kompas*, 20 July 1997.

rights, it is said that the position of the military and the civilians is equal; the military is not below the civilians, and the civilians are not above the military. Thus, the military claim, there is neither civilian supremacy nor military supremacy,⁸⁹ albeit in reality this political jargon is highly questionable. As a result, in view of the “equal” position, the military insists, there are no reasons to demand the establishment of civilian control/supremacy. Given this notion, the intention to establish military withdrawal is regarded as irrelevant and unnecessary.

In short, the existence of *dwifungsi* has stymied external factors in the struggle for substantial military withdrawal. *Dwifungsi* is also responsible for internal factors “sleeping.”

In regard to the government’s discourse in defining Indonesian (political) culture, one should see the legacy of the New Order government — which is still adhered — in making Indonesian culture contrast with that of Western countries. The Indonesian government claims that Indonesian political culture is unique. It is said that Indonesia adheres to Pancasila Democracy which is neither Liberal Democracy nor Guided Democracy, neither based on capitalism nor communism, and so on. According to William Liddle, this discourse is called the government’s adherence to the ideology of *in-betweenness*:

....incompleteness and inbetweenness
are still defining characteristics of the

⁸⁹ The military have even claimed that there is no concept of “civil-military relations” in Indonesia. See Ian MacFarling, *The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia* (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies, 1996), p. 166.

national culture. For, example, intellectuals frequently complain that the national culture is only defined by what it is not; not theocratic but not secular, not liberal democratic but not totalitarian, not capitalist but not socialist....⁹⁰

The adherence to this ideology paved the way for the government’s theory of cultural relativism,⁹¹ whereby it is said that Indonesia has a right to solve its problems (e.g. human rights issues) with its own ways. It is also said that Indonesia does not need to adopt Western ideology, notions, and so on as Indonesia has a specific ideology or notion which is claimed to be rooted in its cultural tradition and practices. This finally arrives at the point that the concept of civilian supremacy or civilian control does not fit with Indonesian culture but is regarded as a Western Liberal Democracy idea. Ironically, many politicians and academics accept this notion without question. Accordingly, there is little room for discussion on the establishment of total military withdrawal. Any efforts to establish civilian control are regarded as trying to Westernise Indonesia or destroy Indonesian culture. As a result, the struggle of reform-minded groups (external factor) is always condemned. The military (internal factor), on the other hand, stands firm with its

⁹⁰ In Todung Mulya Lubis, *In Search of Human Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New Order, 1966-1990* (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia and SPES Foundation, 1993), p. 175.

⁹¹ Cf. Richard Robison, “Indonesia: Tension in State and Regime,” in Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison and Gary Rodan (eds.), *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 42.

attitudes to counter any anti-opposition to dual function on the pretext of preserving national culture.

Another factor against military withdrawal is the military's desire to protect its economic interests through political power. This is important for the military as its budgets are insufficient to fulfill such military needs as the need to build barracks. The study of Jon Halldorsson shows that the military's firm stance in relation to retaining the status quo is a result of the military interest of access to economic resources.⁹²

Conditions

Such impediments made factors leading to military withdrawal impotent. However, this is not the end of the world. Rather, certain conditions do not exist yet in Indonesia to optimise the "performance" of such factors. Thus, to "tame" dual function, government cultural relativist discourse, and military economic interests, or to make the internal and external factors perform best, certain conditions are needed.

The first condition is the emergence of young independent military leaders. As long as the old and transitional generation still exist or control the young military generation, substantial change will be unlikely to happen. Change can only be hoped for when the young military generation takes over power, and especially when they can act and think independently. There are two hopes here. First of all, the young independent military leaders do not have historical claims to "participate" in politics. Without such claims they do not have legitimation to intervene politics. Secondly,

the young military leaders are socialised with recent strong opposition to *dwifungsi* due to, *inter alia*, recent military involvement in the killings of students and abduction of pro-democracy activists. This would force the future military leaders to re-think their doctrine. The more professional the military, there would emerge consciousness regarding contradiction between *dwifungsi* and professionalisation of the military, as Ulf Sundhaussen maintained:

With professional specialisation becoming increasingly time-consuming it becomes almost impossible to train a person in two professions, namely as a military expert as well as an expert in non-military fields. But much more important are the difficulties experienced by professional soldiers, socialised into giving and obeying orders, when their next assignment places them in a political position requiring them to argue and persuade.⁹³

So far, this condition does not yet exist. In fact, the current young military generation is still controlled, if not dictated to, by the military generation who still have old values and historical claims to intervene in politics. Their views on the future role of the military are still unclear. As Harold Crouch noted, "there is no indication that younger officers are inclined to abandon the military's political role but there appears to be no clearcut consensus on what precisely that (political role) should be."⁹⁴ Crouch's argument brings up two possibilities. One

⁹² Jon Ormur Halldorson, Ph.D Thesis, *op. cit.*

⁹³ Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Inner Contraction of the Soeharto Regime," *op. cit.*, pp. 277-278.

⁹⁴ Harold Crouch, "Military-Civilian Relations in Indonesia in the Late Soeharto Era," *op. cit.*, p. 97.

possibility is that the younger generation will continue the status quo. This is not impossible, as they are indoctrinated with *dwifungsi* in military training school. On the other hand, there is also the possibility of change as the behaviour of human beings (the military) cannot be guessed.

The achievement of substantial withdrawal also depends on the civilian situation. What is needed here is the existence of “high calibre” civilian politicians or leaders to provide a viable governmental alternative to the regime. This involves not only their capabilities, political maturity, broadmindedness, and solidity among civilians but also their attitudes which always “respect the individual, corporate and ideological interests of officers.”⁹⁵ If the civilian politicians show that they are capable, respect military interests, and can convince the military that they will preserve and maintain Pancasila, political stability, economic growth, and so on, the armed forces will be more inclined to compromise.

The civilian situation is so far unclear. Hopes for the emergence of high calibre civilian politicians or leaders are still far from reality. One explanation is that they are not yet politically mature. Selfishness and opportunism have characterised Indonesian politicians causing them to pursue narrow interests. One main reason for this is that most Indonesian politicians come from lower-middle class families or they do not have sufficient financial resources to support their families if they are not elected as the MPR members or national/local MPs. This is significant as the state does not pay

the unemployed. The earnings of politicians, on the other hand, are relatively high. This situation makes them concerned to advance their own economic interests rather than to advance abstract ideals. But they alone cannot be blamed as the New Order regime also contributes to this situation; the military under Soeharto regime has played a significant role in blocking the emergence of strong civilian politicians, as they can rival the military.

It is true that the establishment of multi party system in the Reform Order has provided chances for the emergence of strong civilian politicians. To arrive at such a calibre, however, it needs time.

Another condition needed is a significant increase in the military budget, especially an increase in salaries, social security, and amenities for military officers. This is because most Indonesian soldiers are underpaid. In many civilian rules, of course with a few exceptions, one way to keep the military in the barracks is to increase the salaries or standard of living of military officers. Meanwhile, as Huntington has suggested, the increase in military budget should also be directed towards the enhancement of its capabilities in defence matter. For example, the government should allocate a sufficient budget for regular military war exercises, or the purchase of new military “toys,” such as new and fancy tanks, aircrafts, armoured cars, sophisticated electronic equipment, new computerised systems, and so on.⁹⁶ These efforts would have a significant impact. With sufficient military budget for its operation in defence matters and the

⁹⁵ Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Inner Contraction of the Soeharto Regime,” *op. cit.*, p. 281.

⁹⁶ Huntington, *The Third Wave Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-253.

existence of new “toys,” the military personnel would be busy and happy so that most of their time would be spent doing their jobs and mastering such “toys.” Along with their satisfaction in salaries and social security, there would be relatively no strong reason to be involved in business. This in turn could make the military more committed to the ethic of professionalism.

So far the state budget is insufficient to cover military operations and the life of its officers, so that the military as an institution and the officers as individuals remain strongly committed to economic activities. An increase in the military budget, however, would not necessarily mean the military leave their activities in business. Rather, it could create the conditions for waning its involvement in such activities.

Epilogue

Based on the above “requirements” needed for military withdrawal, the fate of total or substantial military withdrawal proposed by many sections of the communities appear rather blurred. Conditions needed for such withdrawal do not yet exist.

One may argue, however, recent situations provide entry points. Firstly, Golkar’s agenda on the abolishment of three factions in its body, that is, the armed forces (ABRI), bureaucracy, and Golkar politicians.⁹⁷ The

“divorce” of the armed forces faction from Golkar is regarded as having great implications since their formal political arm would be cut off. Nevertheless, the firm stance of the military to maintain its seats in the Parliament in the 1998 MPR Special Session — which is now being attempted to justify in the election and MPR/DPR membership laws — as well as the absence of military’s formal response to the deadline set by Ciganjur Group to withdraw from the Parliament⁹⁸, even though mass demonstration, uncompromised students’ demands and bloodshed occurred, are efforts to preserve its other political arms.

Secondly, wide supports for separation agenda of the Police Force from the armed forces. This issue is prominent as the separation means the police force would regain its “grabbed” tasks and autonomy in upholding civil order. With significant autonomy, the police force could develop its professionalism as a civil force as was the case of police forces in many democratic countries. Meanwhile, the separation would leave the military responsible only for defence matters. This means, as a supporter of this separation, Gen. (Ret.) Kunarto,

ments as recently, is significant. Will this be truly changed in the Reform Order?

⁹⁸ Ciganjur Group, consisting of Abdurrachman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Amien Rais, and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, declared the deadline of six years for the military to withdraw from the Parliament. Students were however disappointed with this declaration as they demanded the group to propose the abolishment of military seats in the Parliament and *dwifungsi* doctrine at that time, when the MPR Special Session took place in November 1998.

⁹⁷ The intention of Golkar leaders to still maintain its “historical links” to the armed forces even though the armed forces insisted that they would keep distance to all political parties, raises questions on reforms in Golkar. The fact that the armed forces always took sides with Golkar in any elections under New Order regime, even though the armed force issued the same state-

pointed out, "the military must return to the barracks."⁹⁹

This agenda is, however, should be thoroughly observed as the armed forces plan to "transfer" the police force from under ABRI's command to under the Department of Defence and Security's command in April 1999. This transfer is said to be transitional, but when, how and where the police force would be brought afterward is not clear yet.

Thus, military withdrawal from political institutions, particularly from the Parliament — a symbol of democracy — and the separation of the police force from the armed forces are two crucial issues in the Reform Order. Another critical issue is that the serving-retired military officers relations. This is because the abolishment of three factions in Golkar does not necessarily mean the armed forces would terminate its previous role. The still-presence of retired military officers associated with Pepabri (Association of ABRI Retired Officers) in Golkar, political institutions and bureaucracy is a case in point as Pepabri belongs to the Big ABRI Family. The problem is, firstly, the military has a notion "*sekali prajurit tetap prajurit*"¹⁰⁰ (once a soldier always a soldier), regardless of retirement. Consequently, pensioners regard themselves or are regarded as "the men on horseback" or at least as part of ABRI (the Big ABRI Family). Thus, in contrast to many other democratic countries where pensioners who enter politics leave aside their attributes as military men/women and become common people, Indonesian retired military officers

who enter politics would still regard themselves or are regarded as part of the armed forces, and therefore are of opinion that they would or should represent, channel, or be concerned with the armed forces' aspirations and interests. Secondly, Pepabri under Soeharto government was used as an instrument to control and channel retired military officers into the occupation of civilian posts (retired officers who occupy civilian posts should come from or join Pepabri). It is true that in the Reform Order many retired generals are now forming or joining political parties outside Golkar and they seem to disobey "Pepabri rules," yet without official reforms on serving-retired military officers relations, the old practices would continue to exist — in different forms.

There are actually many other issues concerning substantial or total military withdrawal as discussed earlier, but those three — withdrawal from parliament, police force separation and serving-retired military officers relations — are the most crucial and strategic ones as they function as driving forces for total military withdrawal process. Reforms in these fields are therefore a minimum step or agenda that should be carried out to establish such withdrawal.

In sum, efforts to establish civilian control of politics or civilian supremacy in modern Indonesia are complex. They need time and involve many issues. The roles of pro-reform and pro-democracy groups are thus imperative since they are the most dynamic factors in this regard — these groups can "play" at both grassroot and elite levels.

⁹⁹ *Forum Keadilan*, 13 July 1998.

¹⁰⁰ *Tempo*, 25 May 1991.